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THE EFFECT OF ANY WILLING PROVIDER AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE LAWS
ON HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES

Jonathan Klick and Joshua D. Wright

Abstract: Any Willing Provider and Freedom of Choice laws restrict the ability of managed care
entities, including pharmacy benefit managers, to selectively contract with providers. The
managed care entities argue this limits their ability to generate cost savings, while proponents of
the laws suggest that such selective contracts limit competition, leading to an increase in
aggregate costs. We examine the effect of state adoption of such laws on total state healthcare
spending, finding that any willing provider/ freedom of choice laws are associated with cost
increases of at least 3 percent. These results suggest that these laws are harmful from a spending
perspective.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Expenditures on health care in the United States have reached an all-time high. Finding

ways to stem these costs has become an issue of great economic importance. One potential
solution that addresses this problem before costs become unsustainable: pharmacy benefit
managers (“PBMs”). PBMs facilitate agreements among pharmaceutical manufacturers, retail
pharmacies, and health plan sponsors (DOJ & FTC 2004). They engage in selective contracting
to create networks of these providers, which in turn participate in specified plans to distribute
health care services and pharmaceutical drugs to patients who subscribe to the plans.
PBMs represent health plan sponsors in relations with pharmaceutical manufacturers and
retail pharmacies. They negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers and obtain lower prices for
prescription medications due to their ability to make high-volume purchases for distribution
within the network. Additionally, they facilitate administration of pharmacy services on the
health plan sponsors’ behalf. Membership in a given PBM network is often highly exclusive
(Klick & Wright 2012). There is evidence this characteristic contributes to PBMs’ ability to
provide consumers access to prescription drugs more efficiently and at a lower cost than would
otherwise be possible (GAO 2003).1 The more exclusive the network, the higher the volume of a
prescription drug a member manufacturer can expect to sell and the more customers a member
pharmacy can expect to serve (FTC 2005). Thus, bidding for membership in a network is highly
competitive, leading bidders to offer steep discounts, the savings from which are generally
passed on to consumers (Majoras 2005).
The exclusivity of PBM networks, however, also carries the potential to harm consumers
in the form of depriving them of adequate access to their choice of pharmacies from which they
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PBMs are able to negotiate deeper discounts in retail pharmacy payments due to its smaller, more exclusive
network (GAO 2003).
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can obtain their prescriptions (Balto 2011). Furthermore, smaller, independent pharmacies are
often the pharmacies that are excluded from membership (House Committee on the Judiciary
2007). This exclusion raises concerns that competitors are being deprived of the opportunity to
compete and that consumers are being deprived of the quality of service they seek.
In response to these concerns, many states have adopted so-called any-willing-provider
(“AWP”) laws and freedom-of-choice (“FOC”) laws. AWP laws require managed care sponsors
to allow any provider into their networks that is willing to meet the networks’ terms of
membership.2 FOC laws allow an insured individual (“enrollee”) to choose any provider they
want regardless of if they are in the managed care sponsors’ network. These laws frequently
apply to pharmaceutical services and thereby prohibit PBMs from excluding pharmacies that
enrollees choose or pharmacies that are willing to accept the terms PBMs offer. Recently, “The
Pharmacy Competition and Consumer Choice Act of 2011” proposed similar legislation on the
national level (U.S. Congress 2011). Like state AWP laws, this bill prohibits PBMs from
“exclud[ing] an otherwise qualified pharmacist or pharmacy from participation in a particular
network provided that the pharmacist or pharmacy . . . accepts the terms, conditions and
reimbursement rates of the PBM . . . .” Proponents of AWP/FOC laws argue they increase
consumer choice by giving consumers a greater variety of providers from which to choose (Balto
2011). They also argue AWP/FOC laws contribute to decreased costs and permit providers to
offer higher quality service.
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“Every . . . health care provider . . . shall have the right to become a participating physician or approved health care
provider . . . under such terms or conditions as are imposed on other participating physicians or approved health care
providers” (GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20-16 (2010)). “No hospital, physician or type of provider . . . willing to meet the
terms and conditions offered to it or him shall be excluded” (VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407 (2008)). “No policy of
group health insurance providing benefits for hospital and medical expenses . . . may . . . [p]revent any person who
is a party to or beneficiary of any health insurance policy from selecting a licensed pharmacy of his choice to furnish
the pharmaceutical services offered under any policy or plan . . .” (South Dakota 1990).
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The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has long advocated against AWP/FOC laws,
arguing the competitive and potential cost advantages of network exclusivity are hindered when
managed care sponsors are forced to allow any willing provider into their networks or to accept
any provider that enrollees choose (FTC 1993). Moreover, empirical studies suggest AWP/FOC
laws increase state per capita health care expenditures and, in particular, pharmaceutical
expenditures. In one study, Durrance (2009) found an increase in per capita health spending
following the passage of AWP laws. She also found an increase in pharmaceutical spending that
was larger in states that passed laws applicable to pharmacies than in states that passed no such
laws. In another study, Vita (2001) similarly found an increase in per capita health spending in
states that passed stringent AWP/FOC laws. The existing evidence suffers from some key
limitations. Notably, the Vita study was conducted using techniques that are now out of date.
We update the existing evidence using more modern econometric techniques to identify
causal relationships between AWP/FOC laws and health care costs. Consistent with Vita, we
find a large positive effect of AWP/FOC laws on health care expenditures. In fact, we find a
larger effect on per capita health expenditures than that in the Vita study.
We also consider the category-specific effects of AWP/FOC laws on physician, hospital,
and prescription-drug spending. We are especially interested in the effect on the prescriptiondrug industry because of the bill Congress is considering that will apply to pharmacies and
PBMs. We find statistically significant increases in physician, hospital, and prescription-drug
spending.
II.

AWP AND FOC LAWS
AWP and FOC laws change the structure of the health care market by forcing managed

care sponsors to cover more health care providers, pharmacies included. AWP laws require
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managed care sponsors to cover all providers that are willing to accept the same terms that the
managed care sponsors’ network providers receive (FTC & DOJ 2004; Vita 2001; Klilck &
Wright 2012). For example, if a hospital agrees to the terms a managed care sponsor pays the
hospitals in its network, the managed care sponsor must accept the hospital and pay it the same
rate the managed care sponsor pays other hospitals in its network (Durrance 2009). FOC laws
allow enrollees the right to choose any provider that it wants and managed care sponsors must
pay that provider the same rate that they pay providers in their networks (Hellinger1995). Thus,
if an enrollee chooses to go to a non-network pharmacy, the managed care sponsor must pay the
pharmacy the same rate that it would pay its network pharmacies. If the non-network pharmacy
charges more than the managed care sponsor pays its network pharmacies, the enrollee pays the
difference.
The purpose of AWP/FOC laws is to force managed care sponsors to contract with
community and independent providers, allegedly resulting in more choices, lower prices, and
higher quality service (Balto 2011; Klick & Wright 2012: Blumenreich 2003; Rodgers & Weiner
2011).3 Proponents of AWP/FOC laws argue that managed care sponsors and PBMs are driving
community and independent providers out of the market by only including large providers in
their networks (Blumenreich 2003; Marsteller et al. 1997; FTC & DOJ 2004). Allegedly,
without small providers, prices will increase because there is not a competitive check on the
larger providers that contract with managed care companies (National Community Pharmacists
Association 2011). Fewer small providers decrease the quality of health care service because

3

“Commission staff has expressed concerns about AWP and FOC laws, noting that they could have anticompetitive
effects and harm consumers. . . . These restrictions on competition may result in insurance companies paying higher
fees to providers, which in turn generally results in higher premiums, and may increase the number of uninsured
Americans” (FTC & DOJ 2004).
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there are fewer competing firms and because community providers allegedly provide high
quality service (Rodgers & Weiner 2011).
These arguments have convinced some policymakers at the federal and state levels
(Durrance 2009; Klick & Wright 2012). Congress adopted an AWP provision when it enacted
Medicare Part D (Balto 2011). Furthermore, the proposed Pharmacy Competition and Consumer
Choice Act of 2011 includes an AWP provision that applies to PBMs creating pharmacy
networks (U.S. Congress 2011). At the state level, AWP laws have been implemented for
several decades and it is estimated that most state now has an AWP or FOC law in its insurance
code (Marsteller et al. 1997).
AWP/FOC laws are not all the same. The laws vary from state to state in terms of
applicability and enforcement. Applicability refers to how many aspects of health care are
covered by the law (Vita 2001).4 Some laws narrowly focus on a single provider class such as
optometrists5 or pharmacists.6 Other laws define providers broadly and include nearly every
imaginable aspect of health care.7 There is of course, a range of AWP laws that fall between
both these examples (Marsteller et al. 1997). Not all AWP/FOC laws identically apply to
4

“[A]n AWP law can either greatly interfere with regular plan operations or have little effect in practice. The
strongest versions require plans to accept all providers who apply to participate . . . . Less restrictive or weaker
forms of these laws allow health plans to limit the number and classes of providers to some degree . . . .” (Marsteller
et al. 1997).
5
“No agency . . . shall deny to the recipients or beneficiaries of their aid or services the freedom to choose a duly
licensed optometrist . . . as the provider of care or services which are within the scope of practice of the profession
of optometry as defined in this Chapter” (North Carolina).
6
“[N]o provider of pharmaceutical services . . . who complies with the terms and conditions established by the . . .
contracting health maintenance organizations and prepaid health plans shall be excluded from contracting for the
provision of pharmaceutical services . . .” (Colorado).
7
“’Health care provider’ or ‘provider’ means those individuals or entities licensed by the State of Arkansas to
provide health care services, limited to the following:(A) Advanced practice nurses;(B) Athletic trainers;(C)
Audiologists;(D) Certified orthotists;(E) Chiropractors;(F) Community mental health centers or clinics;(G)
Dentists;(H) Home health care;(I) Hospice care;(J) Hospital-based services;(K) Hospitals;(L) Licensed ambulatory
surgery centers;(M) Licensed certified social workers;(N) Licensed dieticians;(O) Licensed durable medical
equipment providers;(P) Licensed professional counselors;(Q) Licensed psychological examiners;(R) Long-term
care facilities;(S) Occupational therapists;(T) Optometrists;(U) Pharmacists;(V) Physical therapists;(W) Physicians
and surgeons (M.D. and D.O.);(X) Podiatrists;(Y) Prosthetists;(Z) Psychologists;(AA) Respiratory therapists;(BB)
Rural health clinics;(CC) Speech pathologists; and(DD) Other health care practitioners as determined by the
department in regulations promulgated under the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act” (Arkansas).
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managed care companies: some only cover health management organizations (HMOs), some
only cover preferred provider organizations (PPOs), some only cover PBMs, and some cover
everything. Figure 1 provides state by state information on AWP laws based on the breadth of
applicability. Figure 2 does likewise for FOC laws. These laws also vary by enforcement.
Some AWP/FOC laws have express enforcement mechanisms such as mandatory arbitration or
other equivalent forms of due process.8 Others, however, do not specify any grievance process
to enforce the AWP/FOC law.

Figure 1-AWP Laws by State and Breadth of Law
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“Every insurance company issuing benefits pursuant to this chapter shall establish a grievance system for health
care providers. Such grievance system shall provide for arbitration . . . or for such other system which provides
reasonable due process provisions for the resolution of grievances and the protection of the rights of the parties”
(Idaho).
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Figure 2-FOC Laws by State and Breadth of Law
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III.

DATA
Following Vita (2001), we examine health expenditure data provided by the Centers for

Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS). In the initial analyses, we examine per capita
expenditures by the state where the health service was provided, while in subsequent analyses we
examine the data based on the patient’s state of residence. The latter data are only available
beginning in 1991, while the data based on state where the service was provided run from 19802009.
In addition to examining expenditures deflated by the aggregate consumer price index
(CPI), we focus primarily on specifications where we deflate by the medical care-specific CPI.
Given that prices for health services grew faster than other prices during this period, the latter
deflator may be more appropriate. We also include some of the controls used by Vita (2001),
8

such as demographic indicators covering race (percent black), age (percent 65+), education
(percent college), and economic indicators covering the unemployment rate and per capita
income.
Summary statistics are offered in Table 2.
Table 2:
Summary Statistics
Variable
Description
Expenditures
Per capita health care expenditures
(provider)
based on state of provision
(available 1980-2009)
Expenditures
Per capita health care expenditures
(residence)
based on state of patient’s residence
(only available 1991-2009)
AWP/FOC
=1 if any willing provider law or
freedom of choice law in effect; =0
otherwise
CPI
Consumer Price Index
Health CPI
Medical care component of
Consumer Price Index
Percent Black
Percent of state population that is
black
Percent 65+
Percent of state population aged 65
and older
Percent College
Percent of state population that has
completed a college degree
Unemployment
Percent workforce that is
unemployed
Income
Per capita state income deflated by
CPI

Mean
3,443

St. Dev.
1,974

Source
CMS

4,517

1,561

CMS

0.50

0.50

1.49
2.14

0.39
0.89

BLS
BLS

0.11

0.12

Census

0.12

0.02

Census

0.24

0.06

Census

0.06

0.02

BLS

15,161

3,218

BEA

We include state fixed effects in each specification, and, unlike Vita (2001) who used a
linear national trend, we allow for a non-linear national trend by including year fixed effects.
We also depart from Vita’s (2001) analysis by using population weights. Because the dependent
variable is a per capita measure, failure to do this effectively treats small states as the equivalent
of big states. To the extent these analyses are used to gauge the effect of AWP/FOC laws on
national health care expenditures, population weights are surely more appropriate. We also
9

cluster standard errors at the state level to account for any serial dependence in spending within a
state.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In Table 3, we provide the basic regression results for both the CPI and medical CPI

deflated per capita expenditures both with and without additional control variables.

Table 3:
Effect of AWP/FOC Law on Total Real Health care Spending Per Capita
Based on State of Provision
(standard errors clustered by state)
CPI Deflated
Medical CPI Deflated
AWP/FOC
122.30*
55.82*
95.12**
43.76**
(66.14)
(31.30)
(44.88)
(19.46)
State Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Year Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Control
No
Yes
No
Yes
Variables
Note: Data cover period 1980-2009. All specifications weighted by state population. Control
variables include percent black, percent 65+, percent college, unemployment, and income.
***p < 0.01 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
**p < 0.05 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
*p < 0.10 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)

Interestingly, despite examining a longer time period and using the more general
specification that includes year fixed effects instead of a common linear trend, the effect we
estimate in the CPI deflated specification that includes the control variables, is quite close to that
estimated by Vita (2001). Our estimate that AWP/FOC laws are associated with an increase in
real per capita spending of about $56 implies a relative increase of about 2.6 percent. When
examining the medical CPI deflated expenditures, the percentage increase is 2.8 percent, and in
that case, the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, whereas the coefficient
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in the specifications using the aggregate CPI to deflate expenditures is only statistically
significant at the 10 percent level.
There is some problem, however, in examining the level of health care expenditures,
given the wide variation in state to state spending. To account for these different levels, in Table
4, we examine the natural log of per capita health care expenditures. In this and subsequent
tables, we focus on the medical CPI deflated expenditures. In this case, we also provide analyses
of the data by the state of residence of the patient.
Table 4:
Effect of AWP/FOC Law on Total Real Health care Spending Per Capita
Log Specification; Medical CPI Deflated
(standard errors clustered by state)
By State of Provider
By State of Residence
AWP/FOC
0.07**
0.03**
0.03***
0.02*
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Percentage
6.8%
3.1%
3.3%
2.0%
Change
State Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Year Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Control
No
Yes
No
Yes
Variables
Sample Period
1980-2009
1991-2009
Note: All specifications weighted by state population. Control variables include percent black,
percent 65+, percent college, population growth, population density, unemployment, and income.
***p < 0.01 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
**p < 0.05 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
*p < 0.10 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)

Using the log specification, we find a larger proportionate effect of AWP/FOC laws on
the order of at least 3 percent, and the effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This
increase is also observed if we focus on the shorter sample that covers expenditures by state of
residence, suggesting that this difference is not driving our results. Given this and the fact that
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the provider based data allows for a longer sample period, we focus attention on this metric
going forward.
Restricting attention to total health care spending may obscure interesting differences
across spending categories. To examine this, we analyze the effect of AWP/FOC laws on
spending by expenditure category in Table 5. We focus on hospital care, physician services, and
prescription drugs spending, all deflated by the medical care CPI.

AWP/FOC

Table 5:
Effect of AWP/FOC Laws on Per Capita Expenditures by Category
(standard errors clustered by state)
ln(Hospital Expenditures)
ln(Physician
ln(Drug Expenditures)
Expenditures)
0.07**
0.04**
0.09**
0.04*
0.08**
0.04*
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.02)
7.0%
3.8%
9.0%
3.7%
8.8%
3.7%

Percentage
Change
State Fixed Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Year Fixed Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Control
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Variables
Note: Data cover period 1980-2009. All specifications weighted by state population. Control
variables include percent black, percent 65+, percent college, unemployment, and income.
***p < 0.01 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
**p < 0.05 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
*p < 0.10 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)

These results suggest that the effect of AWP/FOC laws is fairly consistent across
spending categories.
In an attempt to further investigate causality in these relationships, we exploit the fact
that AWP/FOC laws should not affect (or, at least, should have a smaller effect on) certain health
spending categories. Specifically, while spending on dental procedures, durable goods, home
health care and the like, will be affected by unobservable changes in a state’s collective health
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preferences and other hard to quantify forces in the market for health care, they should be largely
unaffected by AWP/FOC laws. Thus, they provide us with an opportunity to control for these
unobservables, further isolating the causal effect of AWP/FOC laws on the relevant health
expenditures. In Table 6, we reexamine spending by category replacing our other control
variables with a control for the natural log of spending in unaffected health categories.

AWP/FOC

Table 6:
The Effect of AWP/FOC Laws on Health Expenditures by Category
Controlling for Unaffected Health Spending
(standard errors clustered by state)
ln(Total
ln(Hospital
ln(Physician
ln(Drug
Expenditures)
Expenditures)
Expenditures)
Expenditures)
0.04***
0.05**
0.06***
0.06**
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.65***
0.46***
0.62***
0.64***
(0.08)
(0.14)
(0.10)
(0.17)
3.7%
4.7%
6.0%
5.8%

Unaffected
Spending
Percentage
Change
State Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Year Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Note: Data cover period 1980-2009. All specifications weighted by state population.
***p < 0.01 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
**p < 0.05 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
*p < 0.10 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)

Using this approach, we find strong evidence of an effect of AWP/FOC laws on spending
across all categories. The effect is consistently statistically significant, and it is practically
important. We find that these laws are associated with a 4.7 percent increase in real per capita
spending on hospitals, a 6 percent increase in physician spending, and a 5.8 percent increase in
drug spending.
While the foregoing evidence is highly suggestive that the estimated relationship between
AWP/FOC laws and health care expenditures is causal, since it appears to not be driven by any

13

unobserved trends in health preferences that affect both spending and the passage of these laws,
we can estimate a more general relationship. That is, the results presented in Table 6 condition
on the average relationship between unaffected health care spending and affected health care
spending across all of the states. We can, however, allow this relationship to differ between
states by interacting the unaffected log spending variable with the state fixed effects. We present
results from this specification in Table 7.
Table 7:
The Effect of AWP/FOC Laws on Health Expenditures by Category
Controlling for Unaffected Health Spending Differentially Across States
(standard errors clustered by state)
ln(Total
ln(Hospital
ln(Physician
ln(Drug
Expenditures)
Expenditures)
Expenditures)
Expenditures)
AWP/FOC
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.04**
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Percentage
1.3%
1.4%
2.2%
4.1%
Change
Unaffected
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Spending * State
Fixed Effects
State Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Year Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Note: Data cover period 1980-2009. All specifications weighted by state population.
***p < 0.01 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
**p < 0.05 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)
*p < 0.10 (against a two-tailed test of a zero coefficient)

In this highly demanding specification, which both adds a large number of controls to the
model and potentially biases the results toward zero if some of the health care spending outside
of the categories of hospital expenditures, physician expenditures, and drug expenditures is in
fact affected by AWP/FOC laws, we still find that the laws have a positive and practically
significant effect on health care expenditures. Although the results are not statistically
significant for total, hospital, or physician expenditures, they are statistically significant for
14

prescription drug spending at the 5 percent level. For that category, the relative increase is
particularly large, exceeding 4 percent.
Taken together, these results strongly suggest that AWP/FOC laws raise health care
expenditures by a significant amount. This supports the general theory that AWP/FOC laws
should not be used, even when the law narrowly focuses on areas like the pharmaceutical
industry . These findings undermine the rationale for AWP/FOC because these laws do not
decrease costs as proponents assume. This is especially important to the pharmaceutical industry
where no matter how the model was specified, AWP/FOC laws resulted in a statistically
significant increase in prescription drug spending. Thus, Congress should abandon The
Pharmacy Competition and Consumer Choice Act of 2011, leaving PBMs free to contract.
V.

CONCLUSION

PBMs create substantial health care savings through negotiating rebates from drug manufacturers
and decreased costs from pharmacies. Yet, state legislatures undermine PBMs’ ability to
function through AWP/FOC laws in an attempt save costs. Congress itself is considering an
AWP law that further harms PBMs. We add to previous literature by measuring the effect of
AWP/FOC laws on total, hospital, physician, and prescription drug expenditures. We find a
statistically significant increase in expenditures in all four of these categories because of
AWP/FOC laws. This suggests that AWP/FOC laws may be a poor idea from a public policy
perspective.
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